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ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United
States government acted to combat terrorism and bring those who supported
the perpetrators of the attacks to justice.' President George W. Bush created
the position of Director of Homeland Security, naming former Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Ridge to the post;' Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act,
containing several anti-terrorism provisions;3 and throughout the country,
officials took steps to tighten security at likely targets, including airports,
sporting events, and government buildings."
The United States was not alone, however, in responding to the tragedy of
September 11. On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council' met and
issued a press release announcing NATO's intention to invoke Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty upon a showing that the attack came from outside the
United States.' By early October, NATO became convinced that an interna-
tional terrorist group, Al Queida, headed by Osama bin Laden, was behind the
attacks,7 thereby confirming the decision to invoke Article 5V This was the
first time in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty that NATO has invoked
Article 5 in response to an attack on a member state.'
Subsequent to the invocation of Article 5, NATO took two significant
actions. First, NATO dispatched Airborne Warning And Control System
See September11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12,2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
US/09/1 i/chronology.attack/index.html.
2 See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Bush Ridge Text (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.
westlaw.com.
See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
'See, e.g., Sara Kehaulani Goo etal., Holiday TestsAirport Security, Tighter Measures are
Inconsistent, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2001, 2001 WL 30326951.
I See NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO: FACTS ABOUT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION 20 (1965) (the North Atlantic Council is the supreme executive body for NATO).
6 See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12,2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
' See Press Release, United Nations (Oct. 2,2001), http://nato.int/docu/updte/2001/1001/
e 1002a.htm.
I Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would only be invoked in the case of an outside
aggressor; if the terrorist acts of September I I had been the product of terrorist groups based
within the United States, then Article 5 would not apply; see North Atlantic Treaty, infra note
47, art. 5.
1 See Christopher Bennett, Aiding America, NATO Review, Winter, 2001, p. 6, available
at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-0 l.htm.
20021
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
aircraft (AWACS) to the United States to assist in its anti-terrorism efforts;' °
second, and it pledged its support" to a U.S.-led military campaign in
Afghanistan, which included aerial bombing, cruise missile attacks, and
Special Forces missions." This military campaign has focused both on the
training camps and other assets of Al Queida within Afghanistan, and at
Afghanistan's ruling regime, the Taliban. "
This Note will examine Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; its history,
formation, relationship to the Treaty as a whole, and function within the
boundaries set by the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, it will
consider the question of what should, or should not, trigger an invocation of
Article 5, focusing on the intent of the drafting parties of the Treaty, as well
as the nature of the alliance itself. It will also examine the potential legal and
political problems of invoking Article 5. Finally, it will consider whether
Article 5 is the most efficient method by which NATO member states can
respond to a terrorist attack, or whether the same results can be achieved
without invoking Article 5.
This Note will show that NATO invoked Article 5 under a set of circum-
stances that were completely different from those envisioned in the drafting of
the Treaty. It will also show that Article 5 was not designed to deal with this
type of attack. Furthermore, it will illustrate the many potential pitfalls in
using Article 5 to deal with terrorist attacks. Finally, it will propose that
NATO reserve Article 5 for large-scale attacks on NATO by the armed forces
of sovereign states, and use current and future anti-terrorist agreements and
partnerships to combat attacks like those on September 11.
10 See id.
" See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. NATO support of the military campaign
in Afghanistan did not extend to active participation; only the United Kingdom participated in
the military campaign along with the United States.
2 See Press Release, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release M-
NAC-2 (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-159e.htm.
" The Taliban were not recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan; moreover, they gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al Queida
terrorist network. Despite requests by the US to turn over bin Laden, the Taliban refused to do
so absent clear proof that bin Laden and Al Queida were responsible for the September 11
attacks. See Taliban Leader: Preparefor Holy War, Sept. 14, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/
200 1/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/14/afghan.denial/index.htrrd.
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II. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY: ITS ORIGINS AND PRECEDENTS
Even before America's entry into World War II, some Western countries
began to recognize the need for cooperation and collaboration with respect to
security and territorial integrity. Through the aggressive actions taken by Nazi
Germany both before and immediately after the beginning of the war in
Europe,' the Western democracies came to understand the price of isolation-
ism and "appeasement" as practiced by Great Britain in the 1930s. 5 Largely
in response to this worldwide threat posed by the Nazis and the other Axis
powers, on August 14, 1941, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill issued a "Declaration of Principles issued
by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom," which soon became known as "The Atlantic Charter."' 6
A. The Atlantic Charter
The Atlantic Charter was a joint statement outlining eight common
principles, and while some of these directly or indirectly dealt with the Nazi
menace, 7 two of the stated principles in the Atlantic Charter looked ahead to
the post-war world:
6. After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see
established a peace which will afford to all nations the means
of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which
will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live
out their lives in freedom from fear and want; ...
'4 These actions included the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudetenland;
see Appeasement, SECOND WORLD WAR ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.
uk/2WWappeasement.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
's See id.
6 See NATO Basic Documents, available at http://www.nato.inttdocu/basictxt/b410814a.
htm (on its official website, NATO refers to the Atlantic Charter as one of the "Antecedents of
the Alliance").
"' See id. ("They [the United States and the United Kingdom] desire to see no territorial
changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," a
statement referring to the pre-war Nazi occupation of several European countries, such as Austria
and Czechoslovakia, and the subsequent Nazi military conquest of Poland, the Low Countries,
and France).
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8. They believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as
well spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the
use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land,
sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations
which threaten, or may threaten aggression outside of their
frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider
and permanent system of general security, that the disarma-
ment of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and
encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten
for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.8
The latter principle is an early example of the nascent concept of collective
self-defense. The language of this principle suggests that the United States and
Great Britain recognized, even as World War II was still in its early stages, that
they would likely be called upon to assist smaller Western nations with 'the
crushing burden of armament' in the post-war world. 9 The language of this
part of the Charter seems to foreshadows some of the language used in the
North Atlantic Treaty.
Exactly one year after the issuance of the Atlantic Charter, President
Roosevelt issued another statement in which he reaffirmed the United States'
comnitment to the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter.2" The Atlantic
Charter demonstrated the resolve of the United States and Great Britain to
stand up to the Axis threat,2 but despite this example of solidarity, the Atlantic
Charter did not directly lead to a postwar Western alliance with the United
States and Great Britain as central members.
"' Id. (emphasis added).
19 Id.
20 See id.
2 In March, 1941, only a few months before the issuing of the Atlantic Charter, the United
States enacted the Lend-Lease Act, which gave President Roosevelt the power to aid Great
Britain (in the form of military supplies) despite the fact that the United States was still officially
neutral in World War 11. The Atlantic Charter is therefore part of the larger course of events
through which the United States eventually participated in the European Theater as an ally of
Great Britain. See, e.g., A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN PouCY: BAsic DOCuMENTS 1941-
1949 3 (1968).
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B. The Brussels Treaty
Despite the close ties between the United States and Great Britain evident
in the Atlantic Charter, the first major European forerunner to NATO, the
Brussels Treaty, did not include the United States as a party.' The Brussels
Treaty grew out of an earlier agreement, the Dunkirk Treaty of March 4, 1947,
between Great Britain and France." The Dunkirk Treaty consisted of a fifty-
year alliance between Britain and France, with both nations hoping in vain that
the United States and the Soviet Union might also accede to the treaty.24
Largely due to this failure, Great Britain and France joined with Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg in creating the Brussels Treaty of March 17,
1948.' The Brussels Treaty held great significance for Western Europe in that
it laid the groundwork for several of the subsequent organizations devoted to
European economic, social, military, and even political unity. 6
Sections of the Brussels Treaty may have inspired certain elements of the
North Atlantic Treaty. The introductory section echoed several major themes
found in abundance in the North Atlantic Treaty.27 It stressed both the
collective nature of the agreement and the understanding that this was an
agreement signed under the aegis of the United Nations, and not an attempt to
refute or even question the authority of the UN:'
Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights...
and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations... To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts
to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic
" Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, Mar.
17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty] (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were the signatories of the Treaty).
" See HALFORD L. HOsKINS, THE ATLANTIC PACT 22 (1949).
24 See id.
21 See id.
2'6 See id. at 22-23.
' Compare Brussels Treaty, supra note 22 pmbl., with North Atlantic Treaty, infra note 47,
arts. 1-2.
20 See Brussels Treaty,supra note 22, art. 5; but seePETERG. BOYLE, AMERICA'S HESITANT
ROAD TO NATO: 1945-1949, 33 (Joseph Smith ed., 1990) (suggesting that the North Atlantic
Treaty shows such strong deference to the United Nations less because of the wording of the
Brussels Treaty, and more because of American public opinion, which was squarely behind the
UN in the late 1940s and would have disapproved of any agreement seen to threaten the
authority of the UN).
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economic recovery; To afford assistance to each other, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintain-
ing international peace and security and in resisting any policy of
aggression.. . Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty
for collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for
collective self-defence .... 29
Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty reiterates the interrelation of the Treaty and the
UN; the Article states that if the Treaty members engage in military action in
self-defense, "[a]ll measures taken. . . shall be immediately reported to the
[UN] Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
Finally, Article 7 of the Treaty created a Consultative Council, whose
duties included promoting economic cooperation and recovery amongst the
Treaty countries and examining any threats to peace." Many of the central
concepts in the Brussels Treaty, then, seem to have found their way into the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.
C. The Rio Pact
Though the United States showed some reluctance to participate in any
European alliances and never became part of the Brussels Treaty,32 well before
the signing of the Brussels Treaty the United States had shown a keen interest
in building a security agreement with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.
Consequently, the United States was one of twenty American nations to sign
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio
Pact, in September 1947.33 While the Pact "was generally regarded in this
" Brussels Treaty, supra note 22.
30 Id. art. 5.
" See id. art. 7.
32 See DOUGLAS STUART & WILLIAM Tow, THE LIMITS OF ALLIANCE: NATO OUT-OF-AREA
PROBLEMS SINCE 1949 31 (1990) (indicating that American government officials had differing
reasons for this reluctance; for example, "George Kennan, director of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff from 1947 till the end of 1949, originally opposed U.S. participation in
a North Atlantic alliance on the grounds that the Brussels Pact of 1948 should be allowed to
stand on its own merits and develop its own military organization.").
" American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature September 2, 1947, 62
Stat. 1681 [hereinafter Rio Pact].
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country as being fully in keeping with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine,"34 it
served as an important precursor to the North Atlantic Treaty because it
established the precedent that the United States could be involved in an
alliance with foreign states without sacrificing its sovereignty.3 The language
of the Pact was also quite similar to that used in the Brussels Treaty and
subsequently in the North Atlantic Treaty. It set up the Organ of Consultation,
which was similar in scope to the Consultative Council formed in the Brussels
Treaty.36 Further, the Pact took similar pains to stress its compliance with the
Charter of the United Nations.3
D. The Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty
While several European nations had already banded together under the
Brussels Treaty, they knew well that any defensive alliance would be useless
against the power of the Soviet Union without the direct involvement of the
United States.38 Unfortunately, for several years after the end of World War
II, the American government was deeply divided as to what role, if any, the
United States should play in world affairs.39 The Soviet Union also realized
that the United States would provide significant backbone to any Western
' The Monroe Doctrine refers to the long-standing foreign policy of the United States, first
announced in a message to Congress given by President James Monroe on December 2, 1823.
Essentially, the Doctrine created a degree of a United States hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere. While the Doctrine did not affect existing European colonies in the area, any
attempt by the European nations to claim new colonies in the Western Hemisphere (or to reclaim
colonies that had achieved independence) was looked upon by the United States as an act of
aggression. In turn, the Doctrine reiterated the American pledge not to interfere in European
affairs. See generally J. REUBEN CLARK, U.S. STATE DEP'T MEMORANDUM ON THE MONROE
DOCTRINE (1930); see also HosKINs, supra note 23, at 14.
11 See HosKINs, supra note 23, at 14.
36 See id. at 86-87.
37 See id.
11 See PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, WHY NATO? 23 (1959) (Spaak, a former NATO Secretary-
General, noted that "[n]obody could reasonably believe that the new allies [of the Brussels
Treaty] alone would be capable of setting up an effective bulwark against a possible attack by
the Soviet Union....").
" See STUART & Tow, supra note 32, at 24-46. One work on the period has identified six
different "schools of thought on American postwar security," including the 'Europe First'
School, the 'Global Strongpoints' Faction, and even the 'Nuclear Reliance' School. While each
of these 'schools of thought' contributed something to the overall American security structure
in the post-war period, the formation ofNATO and the American assets expended on the defense
of Western Europe suggest that the 'Europe First' School was at least partially successful in
making Western Europe a strategic priority.
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military alliance.' ° Consequently an American entrance into alliance with
Western Europe could present a serious challenge to Soviet power in Eastern
Europe." Accordingly, "[t]he Soviet Union therefore fought bitterly, and
during the first years successfully, against any idea of regional organization,
particularly in Europe: and it was inevitable that they should do everything
possible to prevent the formation of our Alliance."'2
The United States eventually realized that despite its isolationist tendencies
(and any possible constitutional incompatibilities' 3 posed by an alliance with
Western Europe), its own interests would be best served by joining the
Western European nations in a self-defense agreement against the Soviet bloc,
especially since the Soviet use of its Security Council veto threatened to render
the UN virtually impotent." The United States Senate announced this
fundamental shift in American foreign policy in 1948 in the "Vandenberg
Resolution."' 5 Soon after the issuance of the Resolution, the United States
began formally meeting with member states of the Brussels Treaty in order to
facilitate a new defense agreement between America and Europe.' On April
4, 1949, the founding member states of NATO signed the North Atlantic
Treaty in Washington. 7
The North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty)48 consists
of fourteen articles, as well as a short preamble that confirms the signatories'
faith in, and continued participation in, the United Nations. 9 The Treaty
allows for the creation of a Council to facilitate the implementation of Treaty
policies,5" as well as provisions for the ratification of the Treaty by the original
0 See SPAAK, supra note 38, at 23.
41 See id.
42 Id.
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
" See HOSKINS, supra note 23, at 91.
41 See A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN PoucY, supra note 2 1, at 197 (the "Vandenberg
Resolution" of June 11, 1948 was a Senate resolution stating that largely due to frustration with
the shortcomings of the United Nations, the United States would associate "with such regional
and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid, and as affect its national security.").
46 See HOSKINS, supra note 23, at 24,26-27.
47 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (signing the Treaty
were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
4" Because the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., it is sometimes called
the Washington Treaty.
41 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47.
so See id. art. 9.
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signatories, the invitation and accession of new members, and the review or
denunciation of the Treaty.5
I. ARTICLE 5: CONTEXT AND MEANING
The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty, at least as it pertains to the military
aspects of the alliance, is Article 5. Article 5 reads:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security."
The central language of this Article, 'an armed attack against one or more
of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all . . .,' is strikingly
similar to language in both the Rio Pact and the Brussels Treaty." The
differences in wording in the three agreements suggest, however, that the
drafters of the Washington Treaty were interested in exactly how Article 5
would operate and what obligations and responsibilities it would place on
member states. Article 3 of the Rio Pact includes the same provision as does
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely that an attack on a member state
is to be considered an attack on all member states. 4 Until the Organ of
S See id. art. 10-13.
52 Id. art. 5.
s See Brussels Treaty, supra note 22, art. 4; see Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 3.
" See Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 3 (the relevant wording of the Article in the Rio Pact,
namely "an attack... against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the
American States" [italics added], might suggest a significant difference between the Rio Pact and
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Consultation of the Inter-American System gives direction on the situation,
however, the members of the alliance under the Rio Pact have great latitude in
deciding what measures to take, if any, in response to the attack on a member
state." Unlike the later North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Pact did not have
France or Great Britain too act as a counter balance to the United States; this
fact may have led to the major differences between Article 3 of the Rio Pact
and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the Rio Pact had no member
states with the economic or military capabilities of NATO member nations
such as France or Great Britain, and since the Monroe Doctrine 6 had guided
U.S. relations with other American states for over a century, the more
discretionary nature of the Rio Pact provision might have appealed to the
United States because it could give the United States the ability to choose its
response to an attack without a great deal of interference from other Rio Pact
members.
In addition to the unique features of Article 3, the Rio Pact contained a far-
reaching provision in Article 6, which stated:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an
extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact
or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ
of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the
measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the
victim of the aggression .... ."
The language of this Article implies that the Rio Pact members could be
proactive in countering aggression that did not amount to an armed attack.
Theoretically, the Rio Pact members could use Article 6 as a legal justification
for preemptively attacking a potential aggressor, even if the aggressor had not
yet committed an armed attack on any Rio Pact member state.
the other two alliances if, by the wording of the Article, the members of the Rio Pact could act
in defense of an American state that was not a signatory to the Rio Pact, such as Canada).
" See id. ("[E]ach one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures
which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation ... in accordance with the
principle of continental solidarity.").
5 See CLARK, supra note 34.
s Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 6.
[Vol. 31:167
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
The Brussels Treaty, on the other hand, provided its members no such
latitude. Article 4 of the Treaty stated:
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an
armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power.58
The severity of this provision probably reflected the rather desperate nature of
Western European defenses in the years immediately following World War II.
By one estimate, at the time of the Brussels Treaty, the Soviet Union could
field 200 war-ready divisions, far more than the Brussels signatories could ever
hope to field. 9 In the face of this vast Soviet military superiority, some of the
Brussels signatories, especially the militarily inferior Benelux countries, may
have had the very real fear that other member states might avoid committing
their forces in a perceived futile defense of another state. The obligatory
nature of Article 4 was necessary, then, to assure the smaller member states
that they would not be sacrificed.'
As the negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty moved along, it
became clear that the United States would not accede to any agreement that
forced it to automatically commit its forces in the case of an attack on another
member state."' This longstanding American policy of avoiding military
alliance with European nations may have contributed to the U.S. position, but
equally important was the fact that such an agreement, inasmuch as it obligated
the United States to go to war automatically and without a declaration of war
from Congress, might violate the U.S. Constitution. ' While Article 5 does
not, therefore, require NATO member states to attack with all available force,
and indeed "each country is thus free to take whatever action it may deem
SB Brussels Treaty, supra note 22, art. 4.
9 See SPAAK, supra note 38, at 13.
60 See, e.g., HOSKINS, supra note 23.
6 The United States had long favored a policy of isolationism; stretching back before World
War I, the United States feared becoming entangled in European affairs. After World War II,
even though most Americans supported US involvement in the United Nations, there was still
a strong tradition in American foreign policy of keeping aloof from the rest of the world. See
HOSKINS, supra note 23.
6' See id. at 34.
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necessary, '" even the smaller European member states understood that the
benefits of U.S. membership in NATO far outweighed any devolution of war-
making power to the individual member states." The smaller NATO states
might well have deduced that the mere threat of American military power, as
well as the economic benefits of American participation, would render the
North Atlantic Treaty more effective and desirable than the old Brussels
Treaty, regardless of the wording of Article 5.6s
IV. THE LIMITATIONS ON ARTICLE 5: ARTICLE 6 AND THE UN CHARTER
In practice, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty only functions within the
boundaries specified in Article 6 of the Treaty.' Article 6, as modified in
1951 after the accession of Greece and Turkey to the Treaty, reads:
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of
the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
I. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North
America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the
territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of
any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the
Tropic of Cancer;67
2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when
in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in
which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed
on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediter-
ranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer.'
Article 6 both expands and limits the power of the Washington Treaty and
specifically Article 5. It expands the power of the Treaty in that an attack on
63 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 5.
" See HosKNs, supra note 23, at 28.
6See id.
"See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 6.
Prior to Algerian independence, France considered Algeria a part of France. However,
since Algeria gained its independence, Algeria is no longer part of the Treaty area as defined in
Article 6. See NATO Basic Texts, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxtttreaty.
htm#FN2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
" North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 6.
[Vol. 31:167
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
a member state outside the geographical territory of the state can still trigger
Article 5 if it occurs within the area defined in Article 6. It limits the power
of the Treaty, however, in that military forces of member states may be
attacked in other areas of the world without triggering Article 5." The limited
geographical nature of the Treaty was largely an American creation; though the
United States eventually saw the wisdom in allying itself with the Western
European nations, it recognized the potential for disaster if Article 5 could be
invoked as a result of an attack on the many colonial territories then held by
the European Member States throughout the world.70 As a result of American
influence, strict geographical limits were placed on Article 5; the final version
of Article 6 excluded virtually all European colonial territory except the
Algerian departments, and then only after considerable pressure from France.7
The geographical constraints placed on Article 5 by Article 6 raises an
important question: how should NATO deal with 'out-of-area' questions?72
This question is as old as the alliance itself; events such as the Suez Crisis of
1956 and the French military conflict with the Vietminh in Indochina clearly
affected the interests of several NATO member states, regardless of whether
they took place within the treaty area defined in Article V, As previously
mentioned, the United States was largely responsible for the inclusion of
geographical limits in the North Atlantic Treaty,74 but by the 1980s, the tables
had turned. American foreign policy had become much more global in scope,
and the revival of the Cold War (coupled with increased defense spending)
under President Reagan meant that American security interests in non-
European areas became much more important than before.75 As a result, the
"See id. In contrast, the Rio Pact approached the problem of how to manage out-of-area
attacks on member forces quite differently. As mentioned previously, Article 6 of the Rio Pact
gave its members considerable discretion in responding to situations that did not meet the
requirements for invoking Article 3 of the Pact. However, some of the language of Article 3
specifically realized the problem posed by outside attacks on Rio Pact forces, and very
deliberately applied Article 6 to them, stating: "The provisions of this Article [Article 3] shall
be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place ... within the territory of an American
State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be
applied." See Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 6.
70 See LORD IsMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 10 (1955).
71 See id.
n See BENTNICK, infra note 75; see also Helmut Schmidt, The Transatlantic Alliance in the
21st Century, NATO Review, 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition, pp. 22-23, available
at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/50th-ann/p-23.shtrl.
7 See STUART&TOw, supra note 32, at 58, 180.
" See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75 See MARC BENmICK, NATO's Our OF AREA PROBLEM 4 (Adelphia Papers 211, Autumn
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United States has pushed for more NATO involvement (on a planning or
consultative level, if not a military one) in areas outside of the Article 6
boundaries.7 6 When Article 5 is properly invoked pursuant to the geographical
limits set by Article 6, however, the out-of-area question becomes all but moot
for future action outside Article 6 geography.
77
The other major limitation on Article 5 is the United Nations Charter itself.
Article 5, in acknowledging its subordinate role vis-i-vis the UN, contains a
specific reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 78 Article 51
states,
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.79
Under Article 5 1, then, any actions taken by NATO or its member states under
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty must be reported to the UN Security
1986).
76 See id.
' See supra note 72. A strong policy argument can be made that once Article 5 is invoked,
the limits in Article 6 no longer apply. If, for example, the Soviet Union had attacked NATO
in Western Europe, this would have been a classic case for invocation of Article 5. Once Article
5 had been invoked in this type of situation, however, NATO could not be expected to confine
its military operations to Western Europe. Certainly the military forces of NATO member states
that were stationed in other parts of the world might have participated in actions against the
Soviets. To hold otherwise would pose a grave danger; for example, if the Soviets had launched
a small-scale attack on purely European forces in Western Europe while simultaneously massing
huge numbers of forces in the Bering Straits for an attack on Alaska, NATO would have been
justified in using force in Western Europe, but NATO would not have been justified in using
force in the Bering Straits. Similarly, the United States could not use force in the Bering Straits
by itself under Article 51 of the UN Charter because its forces were not attacked!
"' See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 5 ("[Ejach of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations. .. ").
79 U.N. CHARTER art. 5 1.
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Council. ° More importantly, Article 51 plainly asserts the right of the
Security Council to step into a conflict and take action, with or without the
approval of NATO."'
Since its inception, scholars have questioned whether NATO is simply an
alliance of 'collective self-defence' as stated in Article 5 1, or whether instead
NATO is a regional alliance.82 The difference is crucial, because under
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (Articles 52-54, entitled "Regional
Arrangements"), a 'regional arrangement or agency' is subject to further
Security Council controls.8 3 Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO,
addressed the differences:
The failure to distinguish between associations of nations linked
by a community of interests on the one hand, and the regional
associations determined primarily by geographic considerations
on the other, has led to misunderstanding in the past .... The
distinction is that under the Charter measures of self-defence,
whether individual or collective, do not require the prior authori-
zation of the Security Council, while, on the other hand, enforce-
ment action by regional agencies (as contemplated under Article
53 of Chapter VIII [of the UN Charter]) do require this authoriza-
tion. The Atlantic Treaty provides insurance against a situation
which the Security Council might be unable to control, but it in
no manner impugns the Council's authority.8
Additionally, as far back as the formation of the United Nations, United States
Senator Vandenberg85 had suggested that "a community of interests could exist
between nations not situated in the same geographic area, and that the [UN]
Charter should sanction the establishment of such communities, which may not
be strictly 'Regional Arrangements,' as provided under Article 53. ,.."86
Perhaps the more salient reason why NATO considers itself to be simply
a collective self-defense organization dates back to the early post-war years.
so See id.
SI See id.
8, See id.; see also Hans Kelsen, Is the North Atlantic Treaty in Conformity with the Charter
of the United Nations?, 19 U. KAN. CTY L. REV. (1951).
'3 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54.
4 ISMAY, supra note 70, at 12-13.
IS The namesake of the "Vandenberg Resolution"; see supra note 45.
ISMAY, supra note 70, at 12.
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From the founding of the United Nations, the Soviet Union had used its
Security Council veto quite frequently. 7 The Soviet proclivity towards
blocking any Western moves with its veto gave the drafters of the Washington
Treaty ample incentive to classify the alliance as a self-defense alliance,
because NATO as a regional arrangement would have been virtually powerless
if it needed Security Council approval (which the Soviets could essentially
deny at will) before it could take military action."8 Accordingly, the drafters
of the North Atlantic Treaty took great pains to avoid any language that would
suggest that NATO was intended to be a regional arrangement.8 9 In the end,
the alliance became known as a collective self-defense alliance and not a
regional arrangement, simply because the member states, while reluctantly
acknowledging the regional nature of the Organization, claimed that the only
action they would take was collective self-defense and not enforcement
action."°
While this regional question was hotly debated during the formation and
early years of the alliance, NATO has continuously claimed that it is not a
regional organization as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter." Though this claim has its weaknesses,92 the subsequent additions to
the alliance of Turkey and Greece (not to mention the Eastern European
countries that have joined in recent years) has weakened the regional
argument, since it would be hard to consider either nation as being within the
North Atlantic region. 3
" See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
' See EscoTT REID, TIME OF FEAR AND HOPE: THE MAKING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY 1947-1949 190 (1977).
, See id. at 35, 161.
"See id. at 190-91.
.' See, e.g., ISMAY, supra note 70, at 12-13.
"In comparison, the Rio Pact addressed the regional question in a more direct manner.
Article 5 of the Rio Pact states,
The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council
of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter
of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities
undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or
for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.
Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 5. Apparently, then, the Rio Pact member states would have to wait
for Security Council approval before commencing enforcement actions-but not in the case of
self-defense, which is the right of all nations (or groups of nations) under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. See id.; see also UN CHARTER art. 5 1.
" While this subject is indeed largely settled, the recent invocation of Article 5 in response
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks might well have proceeded differently had NATO
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V. ARTICLE 5: THE PRESENT-SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE
INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 5
A. Problems with the Invocation After 9/11
When considering the events of September 11 and the subsequent military
actions in Afghanistan, the first question that must be addressed is whether
Article 5 was properly invoked. The military operations against Afghanistan
have been a qualified success," and the natural inclination is to assume, ex
post facto, that the invocation of Article 5 must have been proper. The
difficulty in invoking Article 5 for an attack such as the United States suffered
on September 11, however, is that Article 5 was likely designed for a situation
very different from a terrorist attack.9"
The North Atlantic Treaty, as well as the treaties that preceded it in the
1940s, used some variation of the phrase 'armed attack' to describe the
condition on which collective or regional self-defense would be invoked." In
reality, this phrase, at least in the North Atlantic Treaty, could simply have
read "armed attack by the Soviet Union and/or its allies." 7 Since the purpose
of NATO was to counter perceived Soviet aggression in Europe, it seems
likely that the purpose of Article 5 was to provide the NATO Member States
a vehicle through which they could react if Soviet aggression ever gave way
to military attack.
That the final version of Article 5 is purpose-driven is borne out in several
ways, including the geographical limits in Article 6 and the lack of specificity
been classified as a regional arrangement. If NATO was a regional arrangement under Chapter
VIl of the UN Charter, it could undertake enforcement actions through Article 53, but unlike
self-defense actions, these enforcement actions would be subject to UN approval. The important
question here is whether the military actions in Afghanistan are in the nature of 'enforcement'
or self-defense, but the answer to this does not seem clear.
" The bombings and ground operations, in coordination with attacks from the Northern
Alliance (the Afghanis who resisted Taliban rule), have resulted in the collapse of the Taliban
regime, but at present, Osama bin Laden remains at large. See, e.g., Rumsfeld: Hunt for Bin
Laden farfrom Over, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/I 1/1 9/ret.us.binlade/index.
hinl (Nov. 19, 2001).
" One can argue that the invocation of Article 5 was legal, since it was in response to an
attack on a NATO member state. The remaining question, however, is whether Article 5 was
intended to encompass such attacks.
" See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 5; see Brussels Treaty, supra note 22, art.
4; see Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 3.
" See SPAAK, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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in the language of Article 5. While Article 6 is fairly detailed as to where an
attack must occur, there is no real guidance in the Treaty as to what types of
actions constitute an attack." This omission is also present in the Rio Pact and
the Brussels Treaty, although probably for somewhat different reasons; if the
United States wanted to use the Rio Pact as a vehicle for defacto enforcement
of the Monroe Doctrine, vagueness in terms of what constituted an attack
would make it easier for them to invoke the Pact and protect their interests in
the Americas."
It also seems doubtful that the Member States of the Brussels Treaty felt
any need for specificity in terms of what constituted an attack. Because of the
post-World War U political and military situation in Western Europe, even
those who believed in the Brussels Treaty recognized that it was wholly
inadequate to meet the Soviet threat."° In this desperate situation, therefore,
a Soviet attack on one or more members of the Brussels Treaty would likely
be so devastating and threatening to the continued survival of the Treaty
members that defining 'attack' seemed unnecessary.
Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty includes this same undefined 'attack'
language.'°' Despite the participation of the United States in NATO, however,
the military situation in Western Europe was still critical at the time of the
Washington Treaty, and had not changed fundamentally from the time of the
Brussels Treaty.0 2 The language of Article 5, then, was likely kept vague so
that any Soviet military action against NATO would constitute an attack.
Article 5 is by its design, best suited for combating an attack on a NATO
member state by a sovereign nation or nations with well-defined armed forces
and territorial boundaries. The attacks of September 11, on the other hand,
were committed by a terrorist organization without sovereign status and with
no single nationality uniting its members. Indeed, members of Al Queida hail
from all over the Islamic world0 3 and reside in virtually every country in the
" The Rio Pact, however, does modify the word "attack" in its Article 3 with "by any state."
This suggests that an attack by a terrorist group without state approval or support might not
constitute an Article 3 attack. See Rio Pact, supra note 33, art. 3.See generally CLARK, supra note 34; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
too See SPAAK, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
101 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 5.
'"See SPAAK, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
103 One member of Al Queida was even an American citizen; the infamous "American
Taliban," John Walker Lindh. See, e.g., Ashcroft: Walker Lindh Deal 'Important Victory',
CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/15/ashcrofLstatementindex.html (July 15,
2002).
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world.'O4 The difficulty in meeting terrorist attacks with NATO-sponsored
military force, then, would be in knowing exactly who to attack or where to
attack them.
B. Difficulties in Invoking Article 5 Against Terrorist Groups
The attacks of September 11 may not be the best example of the difficulties
inherent in combating terrorism through Article 5. While there was very little
doubt after September 11 as to who was responsible,'0 5 given the sheer number
of terrorist groups worldwide, as well as the proclivity for such groups to
splinter into smaller groups, knowing which group was responsible might not
always be so easy, especially if those responsible decided not to take public
credit for the terrorist acts.'" Even assuming that a NATO member state was
able to determine which terrorist group was responsible for a terrorist attack,
it is certainly possible that the intelligence agencies of the member states might
not know enough about the makeup or membership of the group to mount any
successful military operation against the group. 
1 7
More importantly, an illegal regime, 8 the Taliban, harbored Al Queida and
Osama bin Laden both before and after the attacks of September 11. "° After
the attacks, the Taliban freely admitted that bin Laden was residing in their
country and was under their 'protection. "10 These actions by the Taliban gave
the United States the legal justification to commence military operations
against both Al Queida and the Taliban regime."' Because virtually no
" See Blowback, Jane's International Security News (July 26,2001), at http://www.janes.
coni/security/internationaLsecurity/news/jir/jirO0726_Ln.shtml.
'" See What Proof of bin Laden's Involvement?, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
US/09/13/binladen.evidence/index.html.
10" See Background Information on Terrorist Groups, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999reportappb.htm (visited Jan. 25, 2002).
107 See id.
' See, e.g., Surgo Narayan Sinha, Terrorism and The Laws of War: September II and its
Aflermath (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-sinha.html.
" Prior to September 11, only Pakistan had full diplomatic relations with the Taliban, while
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had limited official diplomatic contact with the
regime. Subsequent to September 11, even these nations broke off their diplomatic relations
with the Taliban. See Diplomats Leave Kabul Empty Handed, CNN.com, available at http://
www.cnn.com2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/08/2 1/taliban.diplomats/index.hml (Aug. 21,2001).
"o See Report of the Secretary General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implicationsfor
International Peace and Security [hereinafter Afghanistan Report], U.N. Doc. A/56/681-
S/2001/1157, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/1157e.pdf (Dec. 6, 2001).
.' See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression ofTerrorist Bombings [hereinafter
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members of the international community recognized the Taliban as the
legitimate rulers of Afghanistan,"' the United States initially received very
little international criticism when its operations against Al Queida targets in
Afghanistan expanded into concerted (and ultimately successful) efforts to
destroy the Taliban itself."3
C. Did Article 5 Need to Be Invoked at All?
Article 5 may not have been the most efficient way to deal with the crises.
This was evidenced by NATO'S subsequent contributions to the operations
against Al Queida and the Taliban. In the fervor immediately following the
attacks, the invocation of Article 5 may have given many Americans a sense
of purpose and a feeling of unity with the Western world, but as September
gave way to October, the fervor died down somewhat, and reality set in.
Consequently, on October 4, 2001, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson
announced eight measures NATO would take to assist the United States in the
campaign against terrorism. "" NATO agreed to:
- enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally
and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed
by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and
according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other
states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats
as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- take necessary measures to provide increased security for
facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility
that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
Convention on Terrorist Bombings], Jan. 12, 1998, art. 2, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-6 (1998)
(Article 2 (3) of the Convention states that "a person commits an offence if that person...
participates as an accomplice in an offence.. ." If a person who acts as an accomplice has
committed an offense, then by extension, one could argue that a government which has served
as an accomplice has also committed an offense.).
Ill See supra note 109.
3 See World Shares US. Grief, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.con/2001/WORLD/europe/
09/13/world.response/index.html (Sept. 14, 2001).
... See Press Statement, NATO Statement to the Press, by Lord Robertson, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s0I1004b.htm (Oct. 4, 2001).
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- provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and
other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic
arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related
to operations against terrorism;
- provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports
and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations
against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with
national procedures ....
- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing
Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a
NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its
NATO Airborne Early Warning force to support operations
against terrorism.'
The very nature of these provisions underscored the point that NATO did not
actively participate as an alliance in the military aspects of the campaign. As
if to further de-emphasize NATO's role in the military actions in Afghanistan,
the NATO press release of October 8, 2001, the day after the commencement
of bombing missions in Afghanistan, noted that "[y]esterday evening, the
United States of America and the United Kingdom began military operations
as part of the global campaign against terrorism," and "NATO Ambassadors
this morning. expressed their full support for the actions of the United States
and the United Kingdom.""' In short, NATO seemed to distance itself,
allowing the United States and Great Britain to take the bulk of the credit (and
if necessary, the bulk of the criticism) for the military campaign. While the
NATO contributions of airspace, military bases, et cetera were all quite
important to the overall success of the military campaign, they were largely
secondary in nature; 7 the United States shouldered the brunt of the load in
terms of military force, as the aircraft and ground troops acting in Afghanistan
were not under the aegis of NATO."'
I15 Id.
... Press Release, NATO Press Release 138, by Lord Robertson, Oct. 8, 2001, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01- 38e.htm (emphasis added).
u See supra note 114.
1,8 See id. It is quite possible that the United States has encouraged NATO to take a
secondary role in the military campaign. From the American perspective, though more direct
NATO involvement would mean greater military assets with which to conduct operations, it
would also mean less direct American control over such matters as targets and search missions
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NATO was not the only treaty organization of which the United States is
a member that decided to invoke its regional or collective self-defense treaty
provision in the wake of September 11. On September 21, through the
Organization of American States (commonly called the OAS), 9 the Rio
Treaty was activated, 20 and the members of the Rio Pact pledged their support
to the United States.' This support, while not primarily of a military
nature," mirrors some of the same ideas present in the first few measures
proposed by Lord Robertson on October 4.'"
After the military campaign is completed, NATO expects to play a much
more active role; indeed, Great Britain has already volunteered to lead a
for Osama bin Laden, as well as greater scrutiny by the international community. Finally, despite
all the talk about forming a global coalition to combat terrorism, the United States may want the
world's perception to be that America won this 'war' more or less on its own (given how deeply
September I 1th has affected a great number of Americans, there is certainly something of a
revenge factor at play here). See id.
" See Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394 [hereinafter OAS
Treaty]; A regional defense organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OAS was
founded on April 30, 1948. The original 21 members of the organization were Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. The OAS now has 35 member states. Id. See also Louis B. Sohn,
Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal From an International Organization, 77 HARV. L. REV. 138 1,
1417 (1964) (illustrating an earlier invocation of the Rio Pact by the OAS; under Article 25 of
the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Rio Pact may be invoked "... to agree
upon measures against aggression or for 'the common defense and the maintenance of... peace
and security' ").
120 U.S. Department of State Press Release, Sept. 20, 2001, Background on Inter-American
Treaty ofReciprocalAssistance, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01092019.
htm (though the Permanent Council ofOAS has invoked the Rio Treaty, not all members of OAS
are also signatories of the Rio Treaty). The Rio Treaty of 1948 has special meaning within the
OAS charter, and the Treaty can be invoked within the larger framework of the OAS under
Article 29 of the OAS Charter. The Permanent Council of the OAS agreed "to serve
provisionally as the Organ of Consultation envisaged in Article 12 of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)" and invoke the Rio Treaty provisions allowing for
regional and collective self-defense. See also SOHN, supra note 119.
" See Montserrat Gorina-Ysem, Addendum: Inter-American Regional Security Against
Terrorism: A Shield and a Sword, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.
htm#addendum6 (visited Dec. 29, 2001).
12 The OAS resolution after September I 1 focused on cooperation between the OAS member
states, encouragement for ratifying the 1999 International Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, and actions of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
(CICTE). See Frederic L. Kirgis et al., ASIL Insights, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh77.htm (Sept. 2001).
" See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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peacekeeping force in Afghanistan under NATO.'" However, the question
remains whether the assistance provided to the United States by the other
NATO member states required the invocation of Article 5, or whether the same
results could have been achieved without taking such drastic steps.
Considering the eight measures NATO has agreed to take in response to the
terrorist threat," 5 as well as the overall NATO strategy of combating terrorism
after September 11, none of the actions proposed or taken by NATO seem to
require the invocation of Article 5. For example, one measure with a more
overt military purpose, that of allowing blanket US overflights of the territory
of NATO member states,"" could likely have been achieved via merely
informal agreements between the United States and the NATO states involved.
Furthermore, since the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has the authority to set
military policy for the Alliance,' the invocation of Article 5 was almost
certainly unnecessary for the deployment of NATO's Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean into the eastern Mediterranean area."'
Finally, the necessity of invoking Article 5 after September 11 should be
considered in light of past NATO military actions, particularly the NATO
bombing campaign in the former Yugoslav province ofKosovo. 29 Because no
NATO Member State had been attacked, Article 5 could not be invoked or
serve as a justification for the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo. The
NATO Member States therefore had to find a way to justify military action by
the Alliance in situations where Article 5 could not be invoked.
On February 4, 1999, while NATO continued its bombing operation in
Kosovo, the then-Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, delivered a speech
"4 See Powell says Britain will take Peacekeeping lead in Afghanistan (Dec. 11, 2001), at
http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm-47068 .html.
"' See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
'26 See id.
32 See NATO Handbook, Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making, available at http://www.
nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb07010 l.htn (visited Jan. 22, 2002).
See Bennett, supra note 9.
329 NATO waged a bombing campaign in Kosovo from 1998-1999 without any UN Security
Council Resolution authorizing its action. Since Russia and China had suggested they would
not support such a Resolution, and since Article 5 did not apply, NATO justified its campaign
by calling it a humanitarian effort. Regardless, some in the international legal community
denounced the campaign as lacking any international legal justification. See generally Klinton
W. Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia's
National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 403
(2000).
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in Bonn, Germany entitled "The New Europe and the New NATO."' a In this
speech, Secretary Talbott acknowledged the origins and purpose of NATO, 3'
and continued to stress that "NATO must maintain its capability, enshrined in
Article V of the Treaty of Washington, to deter and if necessary defeat what
might be called classic aggression."' 2 Secretary Talbott realized, however,
that NATO faced many threats that could not be categorized as 'classic
aggression." He addressed this problem by saying, "we also need to
recognize that most current and foreseeable European security challenges
involve non-Article V missions."'3 4 Underscoring this point, Secretary Talbot
addressed the new NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at NATO
Headquarters in December, 1999.3 In this address, Secretary Talbott
reiterated the idea that the future ofNATO included defending against "Article
5 threats to our nations' homelands,"'36 as well as preparing for non-Article 5
missions, such as in Kosovo.137
NATO's experience in Kosovo seemed to have taught the Alliance an
important lesson. Because NATO was able to conduct military operations in
another country, outside the territory of its Member States (and outside the
territorial limits of Article 6),131 this set the precedent that NATO did not
always need to invoke Article 5 in order to conduct military operations. But
given the difficulties NATO faced in waging a bombing campaign in Kosovo,
perhaps there was another, unintended lesson learned as well-if invoking
230 See Talbott Address on Euro-Atlantic Community and NATO Summit (Feb. 4, 1999),
available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/euro/pressl4.htm.
'3' See id. ("NATO was founded and designed to deal with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. That state and that alliance are gone, and so is the threat they posed.").
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
131 Strobe Talbott, The State ofthe Alliance: An American Perspective, Address at the NATO
Ministerial Meeting (Dec. 15, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/
s991215c.htm (last modified May 13, 2002).
136 Id.
'1" In the portion of his speech immediately following these remarks, Secretary Talbott
addressed the problem of weapons of mass destruction. Id. It is worth noting that the two
examples he gives of NATO's involvement in this issue were "a terrorist attack against Alliance
forces deployed beyond our borders or another state's missile attack against our forces or
territory." Id. But he did not envision a terrorist attack on a Member State's territory as on
September 11. Id. In fact, Secretary Talbott's proposed methods of combating the problem--
diplomatic prevention, deterrence through conventional and nuclear forces, and missile
defense-seems ineffective against a group like al Queda.
"'t See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 47, art. 6.
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Article 5 might help deflect international scrutiny away from the legality of a
NATO action, then it should be invoked.
VI. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ARTICLE 5: CONCLUSIONS
A. Does the Invocation ofArticle 5 Have Any Value as Legal Precedent?
In many ways, the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of
September 11 have been quite unusual; consequently, NATO's first invocation
of Article 5 may be of limited precedential value when considering future
invocations of the Article in response to a terrorist attack. The success of the
United States-led attacks in Afghanistan, as well as the lack of significant
international criticism they generated, seem to be directly related to the
extraordinary aspects of September 11, including:
- The attacks of September 11 needed to be so heinous as to
anger virtually the entire international community;
- The terrorist organization responsible for the attacks needed to
be discernible or visible, so that the United States and NATO
could direct their efforts onto a tangible target;
- The regime that harbored Al Queida before and after the
September 11 attacks could not have been the legitimate govern-
ment of a sovereign nation, recognized by the international
community; further, this regime needed to have strong links with
Al Queida beyond simply harboring the organization, such as
providing training camps, men, and materiel;
- Finally, the nation that suffered the terrorist attacks had to have
a strong voice on the United Nations Security Council, whether
in its own right or through its allies.
In response to the brutality of the September 11 attacks, the United Nations
General Assembly strongly denounced them, declaring that it:
Strongly condemns the heinous acts of terrorism, which have
caused enormous loss of human life, destruction and damage in
the cities of New York, host city of the United Nations, and
Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania;
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Expresses its condolences and solidarity with the people and
Government of the United States of America in these sad and
tragic circumstances;
Urgently calls for international cooperation to bring tojustice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11
September 2001;
Also urgently calls for international cooperation to prevent and
eradicate acts of terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for
aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of such acts will be held accountable.'39
Even the nations generally considered the enemies of the United States joined
in the condemnation of the attacks and the support of the United States.140
This virtually unprecedented outpouring of support created an atmosphere
wherein the United States could take aggressive military action against Al
Queida and its allies, free from any significant international criticism.
Very quickly after the September 11 attacks, the United States began to
suspect that Osama bin Laden, through his Al Queida terrorist organization,
had played a role in the attacks. 141 The result of this early dissemination was
that the general public quickly came to see bin Laden as the perpetrator of
these attacks. 142 Consequently, when the United States and Great Britain
announced the commencement of hostilities against Al Queida in Afghanistan,
there was very little surprise or confusion over the purpose behind the attacks.
Though many Americans were unfamiliar with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan prior to September 11, the Taliban drew criticism from the United
Nations long before that date. On December 6, 2001, the Secretary General of
the United Nations issued a report in which he outlined UN activities and
initiatives in Afghanistan from November 2000 through November 2001. 43
"' G.A. Res. 1, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES56/1 (2001), available at http://
daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOI /475/00/PDF/NO147500.pdf?openElement.
"4 See supra note 113 (noting that Syria, Cuba, Libya, and Iran all condemned the attacks,
as did Pakistan, the only country that had formally recognized the Taliban. Iraq was the only
nation to publicly show its support of the attacks.).
'41 See Terror Attacks Hit US., CNN.com (Sept. 11, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
US/09/1 l/worldtrade.crash/index.html (less than 12 hours after the crash, CNN was reporting
that "there are good indications that persons linked to Osama bin Laden may be responsible for
these attacks").
142 Id.
"4 See AFGHANISTAN REPORT, supra note 1 10.
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The report reiterated that the Taliban was outside the international community
before September 11. '" Further, the report stressed that in the months before
September 11, UN officials had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Taliban
officials to comply with Security Council resolutions, "particularly with regard
to Osama bin Laden and the closure of terrorist camps."" 5 These facts clearly
establish that the international community knew of the link between the
Taliban and Al Queida before September 11, and that the Taliban refused to
discontinue its association with Osama bin Laden and Al Queida.
Without this clear link between the Taliban and Al Queida, the United
States would not have had so clear a mandate to attack Afghanistan, given the
concept under international law that "a State cannot be invaded under the
principle of self-defence unless that State had responsibility for the armed
attack precipitating the defence."'" Even in an earlier case where a state had
clearly harbored terrorists before and after an attack, the Security Council did
not support an attack on the harboring state by the state that suffered the
terrorist attack."7 Because the Taliban did more than simply harbor Osama bin
Laden and Al Queida, however, the United States faces significantly fewer
legal obstacles in justifying its military actions in Afghanistan.
In the months following September 11, the UN Security Council has issued
several Resolutions pertaining to the situation in Afghanistan."8  These
resolutions have touched on several different topics, but none have expressly
authorized or approved the use of force in Afghanistan by the United States. "49
144 See id. at 2.
145 Id.
" Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another
Country, in TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS & POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL
243, 249 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
" Gregory H. Fox, Addendum to ASIL Insight on Terrorist Attacks, ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept.
200 1), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (noting that UN Security Council
voted 14-0, with U.S. abstaining, to condemn Israeli attack on Palestinian Liberation
Organization offices in Tunisia even though Tunisia had harbored terrorists); but see Said
Mahmoudi, Comment on Fox Addendum Sept 24, 2001, ASIL INSIGHTS, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (suggesting that because UN Security Council is not
bound by precedent, and because facts of this case are quite different from those of the Israeli
attack, this prior condemnation would not necessarily lead to a similar condemnation of United
States in the present case).
"' In the four months subsequent to the September 11 th attacks, the UN Security Council
issued six Resolutions dealing with Afghanistan; see http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm
(visited Jan. 30,2001).
'4 In fact, none of these Resolutions have even mentioned that the United States and Great
Britain have engaged in military actions in Afghanistan. See id.
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Security Council Resolution 1373, in "Reaffirming the need to combat by all
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,""' certainly implies
that a state which has been attacked by terrorists may use force in accordance
with its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter."' This
implication looms larger because the United States is a permanent member of
the Security Council, and because as mentioned previously, the Security
Council has on one occasion held otherwise." 2 Furthermore, the wording of
Security Council Resolution 1373, in recognizing that terrorism has become
even more prevalent and destructive in recent years, also sets a dangerous
precedent, as international scholars have already begun discussing just how far
Resolution 1373 allows a state to go in responding to a terrorist attack."3 One
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the United States, by virtue of its
status as superpower, has come to dominate the UN Security Council to such
an extent that it can now dictate policy to the Council.
Given all of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the post-
September 11 events," it seems unlikely that a future invocation of Article 5
would occur under similarly unique circumstances. Indeed, it would be far
more likely for a terrorist organization to go underground in a country with a
legitimate government, and it would also be more likely that this government
would have had no direct knowledge of the terrorists' whereabouts. Given that
scenario, an invocation of Article 5 might prepare NATO for military
operations, but those operations could not commence until NATO uncovered
the whereabouts of the terrorists. More importantly, even after the terrorists
were located, the larger question of conducting military operations within the
territory of another state would need to be answered. In the end, all the NATO
member states could likely do (assuming the state in which the terrorists were
hiding had not harbored or aided the terrorists) would be to pressure the state
"o S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), available at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOI/557/43/PDF/NO1 55743 .pdf.openelement.
" See Surya Narayan Sinha, Addendum, ASIL Insights, available at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh77.htm (November 16, 2001) (arguing that because the right to self-defense is
inherent in every sovereign state, a state exercising that right would not need the prior approval
of the Security Council; accordingly, the United States did not ask for a specific authorization
of force in UN Security Resolution 1373, as it felt it needed no authorization).
152 See Fox, supra note 147.
153 See, e.g., Sinha et al., ASIL Insights (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh77.htm.
154 See supra p. 193.
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in which the terrorists were hiding to find and either extradite or prosecute the
terrorists.' 5
B. Invoking Article 5 in the Future
At heart, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was designed to serve as a
deterrent to any large-scale Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Arguably,
given the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the emergence of the United
States as the world's lone superpower, Article 5 and NATO have successfully
served the purpose for which they were created. Over 50 years after the
drafting of the Washington Treaty, however, a new threat has emerged-the
threat of terrorist attack. Although Article 5 has now been invoked in response
to terrorist attack, the problems created by this invocation are many. Instead
of using the powers in Article 5 directly to create a coordinated NATO
response to the terrorist attacks, the United States and Great Britain have
conducted a military campaign in Afghanistan largely without direct NATO
assistance, and certainly without direct NATO control. The invocation of
Article 5 in this case, therefore, has given an international and 'official' feeling
to an essentially unilateral American-British military action. This process has
revealed a deep flaw in the function of Article 5; namely, that the Article can
be invoked in such a way that it places little or no added scrutiny or responsi-
bility on a NATO member state acting in self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter."I Indeed, the invocation seems to have been nothing more than
an attempt to add an extra measure of legality or legitimacy to self-defense
action under UN Article 51.
The problems associated with the invocation of Article 5 following the
September 11 attacks suggest that a better solution to the terrorist problem
must exist. Given the various solutions offered by the OAS"5 7 and by NATO
itself, ' perhaps even those who invoked Article 5 in the wake of September
'" See Convention on Terrorist Bombings, supra note 11, arts. 6-7 (a signatory state of the
Convention would have the right to prosecute a suspected terrorist under its domestic laws;
therefore, if the United States discovered that a suspected terrorist bomber was a national of, or
living in, another signatory's territory, it would inform the state of its suspicions. The other
signatory state would then investigate; if sufficient evidence is found, it must pursue the matter,
but it has the basic right to prosecute the suspect under its own criminal laws and refuse
extradition of the suspect to the U.S.).
's See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
,s See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
158 See Robert Hall & Carl Fox, Rethinking Security, NATO Review (web edition), Vol. 49,
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11 realize that the powers given under the Article are ill-suited to military
campaigns against terrorist organizations. Certainly the NATO Member
States, like many other countries throughout the world, must face the reality
of the terrorist threat and meet this threat in the most effective manner. Given
the design and purpose of Article 5, as well as its effects, or lack thereof,
following September 11, NATO should realize that Article 5 is simply not an
effective tool for countering terrorism. Invocation of Article 5 should
therefore be reserved for use in response to a large-scale military attack on
NATO.
Certainly, the breakup of the former Soviet Union suggests that Western
Europe may not face any credible large-scale military threat, which brings into
focus the question of whether Article 5 has outlived its usefulness. Even if this
is the case, it does not suggest that Article 5 should now be used in a manner
inconsistent with its purpose and language. Leaving Article 5 intact does not
harm the effectiveness of the Treaty or of the Organization. In fact, Article 5
could be looked upon as an "article of last resort," available in the unlikely
event of large-scale attack, but unused and largely forgotten when the only
significant threats are from terrorist groups. With any luck, NATO would
never have to invoke Article 5 again.
No. 4, pgs. 9-11, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-02.htm (Winter 2001)
(calling for more centralized intelligence structures, such as an EU Intelligence Agency).
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